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AIR

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Attn: CSOB

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Chief, SM

Chief, EN

Operational/Redbox

ARCOB - CR Study of the HASEL-TIEBARS Link

REF : WASH 36558, Para 1

1. A recent study made by a Headquarters CR section indicates that there may be a link between the HASEL-KUNZENTAL complex and the TIEBARS and suggests certain steps that might be taken. This study is based on the ARCOB/ZELVICH files and the pertinent dispatches on the TIEBARS/Baker operation. It should be pointed out that everything that follows should be treated as suggestion or reflection rather than as conclusion. We would welcome field comments on the possibility that HASEL-KUNZENTAL are TIEBARS informants and on the proposed suggestions for testing them. A copy of the study was hand carried to CSOB by ☐ who can fill in details.

2. It seems likely that this case is known to, i.e. penetrated by the TIEBARS. The entire history of the operation points in that direction. HASEL's original contact with, and prospective employment by the TIEBARS established his identification with them. His use of the Voldemar channel (even though he says that he used it for his own purpose); his presence when the TIEBARS suggested a Latvian operation with U.S. support; the fact that the TIEBARS were parties to the competitive bidding for HASEL's services before he was assumed by DYCLAIN (at which time it became apparent that the TIEBARS have an established operational plan while that of DYCLAIN was tentative and experimental); as well as the fact that HASEL left Sweden through normal channels with normal clearance, and, it must be assumed, with the knowledge of the TIEBARS. All compels us to believe that TIEBARS knew HASEL, knew when and where he was going, under whose auspices, and at least generally, what he was going to do. With respect to HASEL's leaving Sweden, one gains the impression that there appeared to be initial difficulties with respect to his departure, such difficulties as to invite suggestion of clandestine exit - after which the difficulties seem to have disappeared. It would be good to know just what the course was of HASEL's request to leave Swedish territory. Finally, there is a direct statement, capable of limited interpretation, that the future activities of HASEL's group will "include maintaining proper relationship with the official Swedish agency in order to keep track of the possibilities which might be opened".

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It would appear that the foregoing facts indicate that TIERMAN knew something about the operation in its early stages, and may have been kept so ignorant later. Whether this penetration ever reached the point of supervision or control is not yet apparent.

3. To reject this possibility on the basis of any man's moral sense would be unwise. Although it is not the purpose of this memorandum to examine hypothetical motives, it might be wise to suggest that an occasional report from HAHN to the TIERMANS could be rationalized on the grounds that the interests of the United States and those of Sweden are not too far apart, while any interest by the TIERMANS in HAHN's operations on behalf of the United States is entirely justifiable in professional counter-espionage. In fact, an intelligence officer or a CE officer who did not endeavor to maintain contact with someone he knows working in another service would be lacking perception.

4. Where such contact or penetration is conducted by a friendly power, it represents only an extension of security, in which it becomes additional task to reassure one's self of the security maintained by the unexpected recipient. In this case, the situation could be complicated by the fact that TIERMAN interest would be exercised by their Baltic States Division, wherein the Latvian responsibility is discharged by TIERMAN, himself a native of Latvia.

5. The important question, it seems to me, is whether HAHN is or is not keeping the TIERMANS informed of our operations and personnel; and we must bear in mind the fact that while such possibility is disturbing from the point of view of good security, it need not be construed as reprehensible. To resolve this question the following action is suggested:

- a. Information should be planted on HAHN - information which is fictitious, but of such nature that it would be of great interest to TIERMAN. A reflection of such information in Stockholm would indicate the existence of a channel of communication.
- b. An informal conference by one of our people in Sweden with a case officer of TIERMAN, in which there would be buried some direct statement that "old HAHN - you know him, he was connected with you at one time - has been doing some work for us. Sadly enough, we've learned that he has been passing operational information to someone outside our own show. We don't know to whom, but we're going to give him a thorough examination and find out. How do you regard him?" Especially if a specific time not too far distant were mentioned for the interrogation, TIERMAN might take the protective step of warning HAHN. A complete surveillance of the subject for a few days (until the specified date had passed) would include interception of all communications to him. This, too, might be productive.
- c. A carriage test for HAHN might be run in with national tests of the same type for other or all personnel in his branch as

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a "periodic routine security measure". Such a test might include such questions as the following: (It is recognized that these questions would have to be re-phrased).

- (1) Did you know that your letters to Sweden are being photostated and translated?
- (2) What Swedish officials did you see prior to your departure? What did they say to you?
- (3) To what extent do you believe that the interest of Sweden and the U.S., with respect to intelligence, are compatible?
- (4) Is REPILOW or ☐ in communication with the TIEBART?
- (5) Are you in communication with TIEBART?
- (6) How much information do you pass to ☐ ☐
- (7) Revelation to assign groups as an influence wedge.

6. In concluding, there are one or two other points which make this case unusual. The story, early in the file, that the operator sent to Latvia has lost all his crystals invites scrutiny. The story that BROADWAY had withdrawn their support from a proposed operation because one man, who was to pilot the plane, refused to provide finances, certainly should be run to ground. There must have been some reason for this action. Did BROADWAY regard the proposed operation as insecure? If so, why? Finally, it seems that HARR's summaries of this correspondence may not have been comprehensive. It is recommended that the photostats of his letters be read in detail, and be compared with the summaries which he submitted.

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